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Abstract 
What have been the most important EU policy and legal responses to the 
2015 refugee crisis? Is Europe taking effectively responsibility in compliance 
with its founding principles? This High Level Briefing takes stock of the 
main results and policy outputs from the EU’s interventions to the refugee 
crisis. It critically highlights the outstanding policy dilemmas confronting 
the adopted instruments and puts forwards a set of policy priorities to guide 
the next phases of the European Agenda on Migration. 
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The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis: 
Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities 
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, 
Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild 
No. 20 / 16 December 2015 
1. Introduction 
The year 2015 has sorely tested the added value and legitimacy of the European Union in 
responding to the refugee crisis. The public outcry and unprecedented levels of political and 
media attention to the dramatic experiences and images of asylum-seekers arriving in the EU 
have put huge pressures on the European institutions and member state governments to show 
that they can meet the challenge.  
Migration policies are now at the top of the EU policy agenda. It is difficult to envisage that 
this will change anytime in the near future. Each of the relevant European institutions has 
positioned this issue at the heart of its respective agenda. During this same period a whole 
series of initiatives have been put on the table and heatedly discussed between the relevant 
institutional actors and EU member states, and indeed with third countries – as the recent 
Valetta Summit on migration of 11-12 November has shown.1 These have been accompanied 
by a succession of inconclusive extraordinary summits and conferences reporting mixed and 
obscure results about the kind of concrete steps the EU might take. The resulting picture is 
difficult for the general public to fully grasp, which has proved to be profoundly concerned 
about the impasse reached on migration and the lack of commitment by European authorities. 
Is Europe effectively assuming responsibility in compliance with its founding principles? It is 
roughly one year since the new European Commission, the High Representative (HR) for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council took office.  
It is therefore a proper moment to take stock of the results and policy outputs from the EU’s 
interventions in the refugee crisis. This Essay examines the most salient policy and legislative 
initiatives taken by the EU in this area and identifies the main challenges associated with them 
from a variety of policy perspectives. Section 2 provides a synthesis of the most far-reaching 
policy, legislative, institutional and financial responses agreed at EU level to respond to the 
refugee crisis. Section 3 critically highlights the outstanding policy dilemmas confronting the 
next phases of the European Agenda on Migration. 
The Essay illustrates that while a number of the recently adopted EU initiatives constitute a 
step forward in the building of a common European policy on migration, asylum and borders, 
a number of far-reaching challenges remain in need of attention. This is particularly true with 
regard to: 
i) ensuring a fairer sharing of legal responsibilities and institutional solidarity between 
the EU and the member states, as well as among the member states themselves;  
ii) guaranteeing a proper implementation and enforcement of existing EU laws and 
standards by member states on the ground and of rule of law principles in external 
border controls and defence/military-oriented responses; and  
                                                   
1 See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/  
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iii) implementing a common EU policy agenda that gives priority to – also in the short-
term – all policy sectors with relevance to migration and not only those related to EU 
and member states’ security. The latter point implies giving proper consideration to 
the repercussions of home affairs responses over wider economic, trade, development 
cooperation, human rights and foreign affairs policies. 
Until the present time, most of these measures did not go deep enough to treat the actual 
dilemma behind this refugee crisis. This mainly concerns a lack of effective action on 
remodelling the sharing of protection and human rights responsibilities between all EU 
member state governments in a way that takes us beyond the current unworkable EU Dublin 
system. Still, events such as the terrorist attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris should not be 
taken as an opportunity to shy away EU member states’ commitments towards the legislative 
and policy measures already adopted in the scope of the European Agenda on Migration. The 
EU policy responses, both internally and in cooperation with third countries, have by and large 
lacked a multi-policy sector approach. Instead, they have given priority to security-driven 
(home affairs) and military concerns and interests of the EU and its member states, where the 
focus on border controls, return and readmission and fighting against smuggling have by and 
large prevailed, instead of first ensuring full compliance with fundamental human rights 
standards and principles. This constitutes one of the Achilles heels of the current European 
Agenda on Migration. 
2. Overview of EU institutional, policy and legal responses 
2.1 Institutional renewal and migration 
Since the inauguration of the new European Commission, led by President Jean-Claude 
Juncker, one of whose Vice-Presidents, Federica Mogherini, is also the new High 
Representative leading the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the start of activities 
by Donald Tusk as President of the European Council, migration policies have been at the top 
of their political agendas. President Juncker’s Political Guidelines ‘A New Start for Europe’ 
included migration as one of the key action areas.2 The new intra-institutional configurations 
of the current Commission included for the first time a First Vice-President in charge of 
coordinating both Commissioners responsible for ‘Justice’ (DG JUST) and ‘Home Affairs’ (DG 
HOME), and therefore politically steering the Commission’s work emanating from these two 
DGs, including on migration policy (Guild & Carrera, 2014). For the first time also, the 
Commissioner for Home Affairs was additionally nominated as Commissioner for ‘Migration’, 
yet without any significant reallocation of responsibilities in comparison to his predecessor.  
In response to a spike in deadly tragedies at sea since February 2015, ‘migration’ has also been 
a key domain of intervention by Federica Mogherini, in her dual capacity as High 
Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) responsible for the 
Commissioners’ Group on External Action (CGEA), which includes Commissioner 
Avramopoulos (DG HOME) in the broader cluster (Blockmans & Russack, 2015):3 
We cannot allow other tragedies at sea in the coming weeks and months; we need to be 
able to give a strong political and operational response. As I have announced today during 
the College in Strasbourg,   I will convene an extraordinary meeting of the Commissioners' 
                                                   
2 Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf  
3 Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/about/structure/index_en.htm#ta  
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Group on External Action in the coming days in order to discuss with the Commissioner 
for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, a review of our 
policies. I've also decided to put a discussion on migration on the agenda of the Foreign 
Affairs Council soon. The fight against smuggling and trafficking, the rescue of migrants 
at sea, the protection of asylum-seekers are shared challenges; they require a stronger 
exercise of shared responsibility.4 
On the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Council in March (the first in 10 years to discuss 
‘migration’), it was decided to organise an extraordinary meeting of Foreign Ministers and 
Interior Ministers on 20th April. This first-ever joint ministerial prepared the first ‘special’ 
European Council meeting on the refugee crisis on 23rd April, after the single-most deadly 
shipwreck on the Mediterranean claimed more than 800 lives. Mogherini has played an 
instrumental role in keeping the external dimension of the refugee crisis on the agenda since. 
Whereas “the need to manage migration properly” (and strengthen Triton, the Frontex 
Operation in the central Mediterranean and the EU’s support to the countries of origin and 
transit) had already been recognised by EU Heads of State or Government in 2014, President 
Tusk tried to respond to the concerns expressed by an ever-louder chorus of EU leaders by 
coordinating a more concerted effort at the highest political level. He appointed former EEAS 
Secretary General Pierre Vimont as his point man for the Valetta Summit process and has kept 
refugee and migration issues on the agenda of every regular European Council summit since, 
including the upcoming European Council meeting of 17 and 18 December 2015.5 
2.2 The European migration agenda  
In May 2015, the Commission adopted the so-called ‘European Migration Agenda’. 6  The 
Agenda is a political document outlining priorities in migration, asylum and borders policies 
for the years to come. The relevance of the above-mentioned new inter- and intra-institutional 
configurations became evident during the press conference presenting the Agenda to the 
public, which started with First Vice-President Timmermans, followed by HR/VP Mogherini 
and only then Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Avramopoulos.7 
In contrast to the previous institutional arrangements, for the first time a common policy 
agenda was adopted between the two institutions, aimed at being ‘comprehensive’8  and 
joining up (or ensuring consistency between) the various internal and external policy strands 
                                                   
4 See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150210_03_en.htm 
5  See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/12/17-18/ See also an 
interesting timeline of key developments in the work of the Council and the European Council on 
migration here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/history-
migratory-pressures/  
6  See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migra-
tion/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf  
7 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4956_en.htm  
8 During the Press Conference presenting the Agenda Mogherini stated: “The response is finally Euro-
pean. And it is also as we say in European terminology, I don’t necessarily like it very much, but you 
know what I refer to, is a comprehensive response, means that it tackles all different aspects of a problem 
that is complex, is not going to be solved from today to tomorrow but we have a set of European policies 
that can be put together, and we are doing that in an integrated and coordinated way…finally we don’t 
have a European response but we have an integrated European response” 
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKxWBvW7llE).  
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and instruments at the Union’s disposal. Yet, has this really been the result so far?  
In light of the increasingly pressing political context surrounding the arrival of asylum-seekers 
through the south-eastern land borders and the Mediterranean, the Agenda identified six 
‘immediate (short-term) EU policy actions’ or proposals: 
1) A temporary and emergency-driven relocation mechanism for asylum-seekers within 
the EU for those member states confronting higher influx, based on a new 
redistribution key criteria for determining responsibility for assessing asylum 
applications; and the presentation of a legislative initiative for a permanent system 
before the end of 2015 
2) A relocation mechanism for 20,000 refugees from outside the EU, and an extra €50 
million budget 2015-16 to support this scheme 
3) Tripling the capacities and budget of the EU External Border Agency (Frontex) joint 
border control and surveillance operations in the Mediterranean (called ‘Triton’ and 
‘Poseidon’)  
4) Increasing emergency funding to frontline EU member states by €60 million, and 
setting up a new ‘hotspot approach’ in which EU home affairs agencies like Frontex, 
Europol and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) would work on the ground 
to support ‘frontline’ member states in identifying, registering and fingerprinting 
migrants 
5) Strengthening Europol’s joint maritime information operation in the Mediterranean to 
deal with migrants’ smuggling via CEPOL (European Policy College)  
6) Establishing a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Operation in the 
Mediterranean to dismantle traffickers’ networks and the ‘business model’ of 
smugglers, so as to identify, capture and destroy vessels used by smugglers  
In addition to these ‘immediate’ actions, understood as more ‘medium-term’ in nature, the 
European Agenda on Migration outlined the following four key ‘pillars’ or ‘levels of action’ 
for an EU migration policy: 1) reducing the incentives for irregular migration; 2) border 
management – saving lives and securing external borders; 3) Europe’s duty to protect – a 
strong common asylum policy; and 4) a new policy on legal migration. Each pillar advanced 
a set of specific policy actions. 
A majority of MEPs supported the European Commission’s proposals to address the crisis, 
while criticising EU member states for their failure to make tough decisions and provide a 
compassionate response to the refugee crisis. For its part, the June European Council embraced 
the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration and stressed the need to make progress on 
all dimensions of a “comprehensive and systemic approach”.  
This approach includes the diplomatic work by High Representative Mogherini, supported by 
her staff at the EEAS, for instance in supporting the UN-brokered peace deal to form a 
government in Libya,9 and by widening the ‘E3+3’ format with Iran in an effort to reboot 
discussions on how to bring about an end to the violence in Syria.10 Mogherini, in her hybrid 
                                                   
9 See M. Toaldo, “Libya's migrant smuggling highway: Lessons for Europe, ECFR Policy Memo, 10 No-
vember 2015. 
10 Joint Statement by China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, 
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capacity as HR/VP, and fellow Commissioners (in particular Timmermans, Hahn, 
Avramopoulos, Stylianides and Mimica) have also tried to move Turkey (See Section 2.3.3 
below), Western Balkan countries, African countries and organisations, 11  toward closer 
cooperation to manage refugee flows and address the so-called ‘root causes of irregular 
migration’.12 
2.3 Adopted legal and policy instruments (May-December 2015): State of 
play 
EU policy proposals have been the subject of intense policy debates over the past six months. 
This Section explores in more detail the main legal and policy instruments adopted.13 
2.3.1 The temporary relocation system 
One of the most controversial ideas has been the establishment of a Temporary EU Relocation 
System for the redistribution of asylum-seekers between EU member states (Carrera & Guild, 
2015). The main contribution of the initiative has been to derogate temporarily the guiding 
rule under the so-called ‘EU Dublin system’ according to which the EU member state of first 
entry is responsible for examining an asylum application. 
The temporary system introduces a new ‘distribution key’ model of allocating responsibility 
between member states on the basis of new criteria, which include GDP, population, 
unemployment, etc. On the basis of the Commission’s initiative, the member states adopted a 
Resolution on relocating from Greece and Italy 40,000 persons in clear need of international 
protection of 22 July 2015,14 which was complemented on September 3rd by an additional 
Council Decision on the temporary relocation of 120,000 asylum-seekers from Greece and 
Italy.15 EU Member States had also committed themselves in July 2015 to resettling over 22,000 
people from outside Europe.16  
                                                   
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, 
and the United States, Final declaration on the results of the Syria Talks in Vienna as agreed by partici-
pants, EEAS Press Release 151030_06, 30 October 2015. 
11 Speech of Mogherini at the opening ceremony of the Heads of State of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, 
Tchad, Mali, Mauritanie et Niger), N’djamena, 20 November 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/state-
ments-eeas/2015/151120_fr_02.htm; and Speech of Mogherini to the African Union, 20 October 2015, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/151020_01_en.htm. 
12  For an analysis on the ‘root causes approach’ refer to http://publications.iom.int/sys-
tem/files/pdf/mpp_issue_22.pdf  
13 For summaries, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5700_en.htm and more recently Eu-
ropean Commission, “State of Play: Measures to Address the Refugee Crisis”, 4 November 2015 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5958_en.htm). See also European Commission, Commu-
nication, Managing the refugee crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the Priority Actions under 
the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 510 final, 14.10.2015. 
14  http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11131-2015-INIT/en/pdf  
15  http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11132-2015-INIT/en/pdf http://data.consil-
ium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11161-2015-INIT/en/pdf  
16 According to the Commission Communication COM(2015) 510, Managing the Refugee Crisis, the first 
resettlements have already taken place and “132 Syrians staying in neighbouring countries have already 
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The first relocation flight took place from Italy on October 9th, transporting 19 Eritrean asylum-
seekers to Sweden. 17  Twelve days later, on October 21st, another 19 Eritrean and Syrian 
asylum-seekers were relocated to Sweden and 48 to Finland. In what concerns Greece, the 
European Commission announced on the 4th November that the first relocations flights of 30 
asylum-seekers will take place to Luxembourg.18 As of 11 December 11th the resulting picture 
is the following: 54 asylum-seekers have been relocated from Greece and 130 from Italy (See 
Table 1 below).19 The EU member states which have participated most actively so far are 
Finland, Sweden and Luxembourg; followed by France, Spain and Germany. It is not 
surprising that the member states’ resolve has become the object of criticism: “At the current 
pace, it would take more than 750 years to relocate the 160,000 asylum-seekers covered by a 
now-expanded resettlement plan.”20 
Table 1. State of play of relocation of asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy  
 F
i
n
l
a
n
d 
F
r
a
n
c
e 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y 
L
u
x
e
m 
S
p
a
i
n 
S
w
e
d
e
n 
I
T
A
L
Y 
4
9 
1
9 
1
1 
 1
2 
3
9 
G
R
E
E
C
E 
2
4 
  3
0 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
 
                                                   
been resettled under the scheme agreed on 20 July 2015 to the Czech Republic (16), Italy (96), and Liech-
tenstein (20)”(p. 6). 
17 For the current state of affairs of member states’ support to emergency relocation mechanism (Decem-
ber 2015), see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migra-
tion/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf 
18 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5971_en.htm and information provided at 
http://www.eu2015lu.eu/en/actualites/articles-actualite/2015/11/04-asselborn-athenes/index.html 
See also http://www.unhcr.org/566eac399.html 
19 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6134_en.htm 
20  See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/merkel-and-east-european-leaders-dis-
cuss-migrant-crisis-in-brussels.html?_r=0 
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2.3.2  The hotspots approach 
A second accompanying measure to the relocation system has been the so-called hotspot 
approach in specific (more problematic) venues in Italy and Greece and the strengthening of 
EU Home Affairs agencies.21 As briefly mentioned above, this model entails the deployment 
of operational support by Frontex, Europol and EASO experts involved in the ‘screening’ of 
third country nationals (identification, fingerprinting and registration), provision of 
information and assistance to applicants of international protection and the preparation and 
removal of irregular immigrants.  
The hotspots involve setting up a joint operational headquarters called the European Union 
Regional Task Force (EURTF), composed by representatives from the three EU agencies who 
coordinate the work on the ground collaborate with national authorities. In Italy, hotspot areas 
include Augusta, Lampedusa, Porte Empedocle, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani. A first 
Migration Management Support Team is up and running in Lampedusa, which builds upon 
the EURTF in Catania, Sicily. In Greece the following areas have been identified: Lesvos, Chios, 
Leros, Samos and Kos. The EURTF is based in Piraeus and the first Migration Management 
Support Team has been based in Lesvos.22  
Frontex has also seen its capacities ‘tripled’ when it comes to Joint Operations in the 
Mediterranean (Triton and Poseidon), including financial allocations, an increase in staff by 60 
new members (corresponding to €1.3 million) and an additional pool of EU member state 
officials (291) to be deployed in the hotspots,23 which compares to the higher original demand 
by Frontex of 775 border guard officials. Frontex is also expected to become more involved in 
‘joint return operations’ and to create a dedicated returns office to organise return operations. 
EASO has also increased its staff (by 30 additional members) and called for 370 national 
experts to support asylum management authorities in Italy and Greece. 
2.3.3  Safe third countries 
A third important development has been the adoption of a Regulation establishing a common 
list of safe third countries24 and the adoption of Council conclusions on the same subject.25 The 
main idea behind the Regulation is the designation of countries, in particular the (potential) 
EU candidates along the Western Balkan route (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey), as ‘safe countries’, which entails that nationals from those 
countries are not a priori deemed as ‘refugees’ and an expedited procedure can be applied by 
                                                   
21 Annex 2 to the Commission Communication, Managing the refugees crisis: Immediate operational, 
budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 490 final, 
23.9.2015. 
22 For an overview of the current state of play (December 2015) of the Hotspots see http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-mate-
rial/docs/state_of_play_-_hotspots_en.pdf  
23  Frontex News http://frontex.europa.eu/news/member-states-provide-291-border-guards-to-fron-
tex-to-be-deployed-in-greece-italy-2tVnYY  
24 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/pro-
posal-implementation-package/docs/proposal_for_regulation_of_the_ep_and_council_establish-
ing_an_eu_common_list_of_safe_countries_of_origin_en.pdf  
25 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11133-2015-INIT/en/pdf  
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national authorities. This does not mean that all applicants of international protection from 
these countries can be automatically refused or directly treated as unfounded. 
To this end, the EU first hosted a High-Level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean 
/Western Balkan Route on October 8th and adopted a plan of collective action. A second, more 
restricted, high-level meeting was convened on October 25th, with leaders from Austria, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia as well as Albania, Serbia 
and Macedonia invited to attend. The Presidents of the European Commission and the 
European Council, the current and future rotating presidencies of the Council (Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands), as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were also in 
attendance. The meeting agreed on a “17-point plan of pragmatic and operational measures”, 
where increased border management and implementation of the EU-Turkey Action Plan 
(agreed on October 15th) feature prominently.26  
More recently, a contact points group composed of senior member state officials, EU agencies 
and the Commission, followed up with, inter alia, an additional 50,000 reception places along 
the Western Balkans Route before the end of the year, of which 12,000 have been already 
committed by Austria, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.27 It also called for launching the civil 
protection mechanism for the benefit of Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia.28 
Meanwhile, the EU has been bending over backwards to engage with Turkey, in the hope that 
the country will cooperate in stemming the flow of refugees. Two extraordinary EU-Turkey 
summits were held in Brussels, one with President Erdogan (5October 5th) and the other with 
Prime Minister Davutoglu (29th November), both on the request of the Union.29  
The EU and Turkey agreed to activate the Joint Action Plan to step up cooperation for support 
of Syrians under temporary protection and migration management for the purposes, 
according to the statement, to address the crisis created by the situation in Syria. According to 
both parties: “results must be achieved in particular in stemming the influx of irregular 
migrants.” It is not entirely clear whether the parties were referring to Syrians as irregular 
migrants or others, one can only hope that they meant the latter. The parties sought to bring 
order into migration flows and help stem irregular migration. This will include active 
cooperation on migrants not in need of international protection to prevent them from 
travelling to Turkey and the EU.  
The parties agreed to activate the EU Turkey Readmission Agreement from June 2016 and 
ensure that it is used to swiftly return migrants who do not need international protection to 
their countries of origin. Turkey agreed to adopt immediate measures to improve the socio-
economic situation of Syrians resident in that country under temporary protection. In a similar 
vein the parties agreed to take decisive action to enhance the fight against ‘criminal smuggling 
networks.’  
This cooperation comes with a price tag: an initial €3 billion of additional resources to help 
Turkey cope with the high numbers of Syrian refugees currently in the country; the 
                                                   
26  See http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/10/20151025_en.htm and the final statement available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/leader_statement_final.pdf  
27 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5952_en.htm  
28 http://ec.europa.eu/news/2015/docs/factsheet_the_eu_civil_protection_mechanism.pdf  
29  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/29/ The German 
Chancellor has followed a parallel track, entering into direct bilateral negotiations with Erdogan. 
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acceleration of the visa liberalisation process; the opening of a new chapter to re-energise 
Turkey’s accession process. One of the positive outcomes of visa liberalisation would of course 
be a stronger border control of its coastal waters, as indeed a change in Turkey’s visa policy, 
provided that Ankara does not abuse its newly found power position in exploiting 
vulnerabilities of the EU to new spikes in the flow of refugees towards Europe. 
2.3.4 Irregular migration, trafficking and smuggling 
Among the most visible responses by the European Commission have been the adoption of an 
EU Action Plan against Migrants’ Smuggling COM(2015) 285,30 EU Action Plan on Return 
COM(2015) 453 of 9 September 2015, 31  and a Recommendation on Common Return 
Handbook.32 These measures have been by and large welcomed by all EU Member States, a 
clear example being the Council Conclusions on the future of the return policy of 8 October 
2015.33 The focus of these measures is on the return of irregular entering and staying third 
country nationals, and cooperation with third countries on readmission.34 
The EU policy in fighting traffickers has also involved the launch of a CSDP operation called 
EUNAVFOR MED - recently re-baptised ‘Operation Sophia’ – on the high seas of the southern 
Mediterranean.35 From its invitation to the High Representative to start preparations until 
today, the European Council has insisted that the CSDP operation be conducted in accordance 
with international law. To strengthen the EU’s presence at sea, the European Council also 
agreed to triple the resources available to Triton, the EU border mission in the Central 
Mediterranean, and to enhance its operational capability with the supply of additional vessels, 
                                                   
30  https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/eu_action_plan_against_mi-
grant_smuggling_en.pdf  
31  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/pro-
posal-implementation-package/docs/communication_from_the_ec_to_ep_and_council_-_eu_ac-
tion_plan_on_return_en.pdf  
32  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/pro-
posal-implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-pack-
age/docs/commission_recommendation_establishing_a_return_handbook_for_member_states_com-
petent_authorities_to_deal_with_return_related_tasks_en.pdf As part of a broader package of pro-
posals, the European Commission and the High Representative adopted a joint communication 
JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU External 
Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built upon the 2011 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility COM(2011) 743. 
33  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2015/10/40802203341_en_635799226800000 
000.pdf  
34 As part of a broader package of proposals, the Commission and the High Representative adopted a 
joint communication JOIN(2015) 40 of 9 September 2015, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis in Europe: The 
Role of EU External Action”, in which they describe how the Union’s international engagement has built 
upon the 2011 so-called ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). The EU and Turkey 
have agreed to apply from June 2016 the readmission agreement. They are aiming to complete the visa 
liberalization process, and the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone, by 
October 2016. 
35 See Council Conclusions on Migration, 12 October 2015  (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/mi-
gratory-pressures) and section 3.3 below. 
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aircraft and experts by member states. Other agreed measures include increased cooperation 
against smuggling networks with the help of Europol and the deployment of immigration 
officers to third countries. 
2.3.5  Funding  
Another rather visible output, this time of a predominantly financial nature, has been the so-
called Trust Funds for the Syrian crisis (with an additional €500 million) and Africa.36 An 
Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration in Africa 
(Trust Fund for Africa) of €1.8 billion. 37  Financial solidarity has also taken the form of 
additional emergency assistance in 2015 under the Asylum, Migration and Immigration Fund 
and the Internal Security Fund-Borders, totalling €100 million.38This has come along with 
additional funding reallocated from the European Neighbourhood Instrument of about €300 
million. For the year 2015, Greece has received +/- €41.8 million (including €8.7 million in 
emergency funding), and Italy +/- €58.3 million (including €19 million in emergency funding). 
In light of the above, most of the ‘actions’ that the European Agenda on Migration framed or 
identified as ‘immediate’ have been largely adopted during the last five months. It is too early 
to project and examine the actual practical repercussions that these EU instruments are having 
or will have on the ground. The framing of these actions as ‘short-term’ by the Agenda is 
however misleading, as their actual impacts will be mainly noticed on the ground in the 
medium and long terms. 
2.3.6  The Commission proposal for a European border and coastal guard  
The European Agenda on Migration adopted in May 2015 anticipated that “within the scope 
of the Treaties and its relevant Protocols”, the European Commission would launch a 
reflection on how to foster “a shared management of the European border”. It stipulated that   
a European System of Border Guards…would cover a new approach to coastguard 
functions in the EU, looking at initiatives such as asset sharing, joint exercises and dual 
use of resources as well as a the possibility of moving towards a European Coastguard.39 
President of the Commission Juncker declared in his state of the union speech40 the need to 
reinforce significantly Frontex’s competences and “develop it into a fully operational 
European border and coast guard system.”41 This was reflected in the Commission’s Work 
Programme for 2016 “No Time for Business as Usual”,42 which anticipated the presentation of 
                                                   
36 http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration/docs/letter-tusk-bettel-juncker_en.pdf  
37  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/emergency-trust-fund-stability-and-addressing-root-causes-irreg-
ular-migration-and-displaced-persons_en  
38 Refer to Annex 8 of the Communication COM(2015) 510.  
39 European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240, 13.5.2015, page 17. 
40 See http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf  
41 The Speech continued by saying that “It is certainly feasible. But it will cost money. The Commission 
believes this is money well invested. This is why we will propose ambitious steps towards a European 
Border and Coast Guard before the end of the year.” 
42 European Commission, Communication ‘Commission Work Programme 2016: No Time for Business 
as Usual’, COM(2015) 610, 27.10.2015.  
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proposals before end of 2015 “for a European Border and Coast Guard, building on a 
significant strengthening of Frontex”. In the European Council Conclusions of 15 October EU 
Member States’ representatives called for the need to  
in accordance with the distribution of competences under the Treaty, in full respect of the national 
competence of the Member States, enhance the mandate of Frontex in the context of discussions 
over the development of a European Border and Coast Guard System, including as regards the 
deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams in cases where Schengen evaluations or risk 
analysis demonstrate the need for robust and prompt action, in cooperation with the Member State 
concerned.43 
The Commission has followed up these calls with the publication of a Communication and a 
package of legislative measures.44 The Communication “A European Border and Coast Guard 
and effective management of Europe's external borders” COM(2015) 673 lays down the main 
featuring components of the new Commission initiatives and the newly envisaged European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2015).  
The European Border and Coast Guard has been developed in the shapes of a Regulation 
under the ordinary legislative procedure. It would be based on a new European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency of semi-military nature and have the legal status of ‘body of the Union’.45 
The Agency would be built from Frontex, and the EU member states’ authorities responsible 
for border control and national coastal guard authorities when they perform maritime border 
surveillance. It would have two main competences: first, facilitating the development and 
implementation of common EU border management standards; and second, operationally 
support frontline EU Member States whose national border authorities are not effectively 
copying with the challenges on the ground. 
As regards the budgetary implications of the proposal, the Commission is envisaging an 
amount of “at least” EUR 31,5 million in 2017 to be added to the Agency’s Union budget and 
an additional 602 posts until 2020 (in addition to the corresponding financial resources), which 
is expected to include 329 establishment plan posts and 273 external staff.46 
The model running the Agency would work on the basis of liaison officers who would be sent 
or seconded by the Agency to the EU member states’ concerned. 47  They would be fully 
                                                   
43 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/16-euco-conclusions/  
44 Refer to http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6327_en.htm See European Commission, Pro-
posal for a Regulation amending Regulation No 562/2006 (EC) as regards the reinforcement of checks 
against relevant databases at external borders, COM(2015) 670 final, 15.12.2015; Commission Recom-
mendation adopting the Practical handbook for implementing and managing the European Border Sur-
veillance System (EUROSUR Handbook), C(2015) 9206 final, 15.12.2015. See also European Commis-
sion, Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area 1 May - 10 December 2015, 
COM(2015) 675 final, 15.12.2015. 
45  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard 
COM(2015) 671 final, 15.12.2015. 
46 Refer to page 8 of the proposal. 
47 Article 11.3 of the proposal laids down the specific tasks of the officers, which include “(a) act as an 
interface between the Agency and the national authorities responsible for border management, includ-
ing coast guards to the extent that they carry out border control tasks; (b) support the collection of in-
formation required by the Agency for carrying out the vulnerability assessment referred to in Article 
12; (c) monitor the measures taken by the Member State at border sections to which a high impact level 
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integrated into the national authorities’ work and information systems, so that the Agency 
would be informed ‘in real time’. The EU border officers would identify weaknesses in the 
system and propose recommendations to overcome them. The Agency would acquire 
important evaluation powers over “the resources and equipment of the Member States as well 
as their contingency planning”, and its decisions concerning corrective actions to address 
deficits or gaps would be binding upon member states.  
The new Agency would move beyond the current Frontex model by: First, creating a 
mandatory rapid reserve pool and a technical equipment pool from EU member states;48 and 
second, granting the Agency the power or right to intervene in urgent situations to a particular 
fraction of the EU external border irrespective of an EU member state requesting it or not 
(Article 18 of the Commission Proposal).49 The Agency would have three main additional 
competences: i) developing the Hotspot approach; ii) coordination of operational cooperation 
with third neighbouring countries; and iii) initiate return operations and support member 
states’ in returns. 
3. Assessing the EU responses: What are the challenges? 
3.1 A fairer sharing of responsibilities in the European asylum system 
Some EU responses can be regarded as steps forward in exploring new ways of sharing 
responsibilities both between EU member states, and between them and the EU. Various 
measures have attempted to display institutional, legal and financial solidarity in the areas of 
asylum and external borders policies. Examples include such instruments as the EU temporary 
relocation system for the redistribution of responsibility for asylum-seekers or the operational 
support by EU Home Affairs agencies to Greece and Italy, combined with an increase in the 
financial allocation of funds. 
                                                   
has been attributed in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013; (d) assist the Member States in 
preparing their contingency plans; (e) report regularly to the Executive Director on the situation at the 
external border and the capacity of the Member State concerned to deal effectively with the situation at 
the external borders; (f) monitor the measures taken by the Member State with regard to a situation 
requiring urgent action at the external borders as referred to in Article 18”. 
48 According to the Communication (pp 5-6): “a rapid reserve pool of experts [would be placed] as a 
standing corps at the disposal of the Agency. … the Agency will be able to call on this pool within a 
very limited timeframe in circumstances requiring immediate response. Member States will have to 
make available at least 1500 border guards to be deployed by the Agency in rapid border interventions 
within days. Similarly, the Agency will have at its disposal a technical equipment pool where Member 
States will be required to make available at immediate notice operational equipment acquired at a 90% 
co-financing rate under the additional allocations of specific actions8 of the Internal Security Fund.”  
49 The Communication states that “such action could be necessary due to a disproportionate increase in 
the pressure at that section of the external border where the national border guard authorities (and 
coastguards to the extent that they have border control tasks) are not able to cope with the crisis which 
has developed. On the other hand, the requirement of urgent action at a particular section of the external 
border could be due to a deficiency in the border management system of a member state which the 
Agency had identified as a result of a vulnerability assessment and had recommended corrective 
measures which the member state concerned failed to implement within the set time limits.”, page 6. 
See Articles 14 and 18 of the proposal. 
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That notwithstanding, most of these measures do not go deep enough to treat the root causes 
behind the refugee crisis (Carrera & Lannoo, 2015). True, the EU temporary relocation system 
constitutes a welcomed move from the EU Dublin System rule.50 The new relocation system 
has introduced a new set of criteria considering other numerical factors such as population 
size, total GDP, average number of asylum applications per one million habitants over 2010-
14 and unemployment rate. 
Although many observers have voiced the view that the Dublin system is ‘dead’ and no longer 
works in practice (Carrera, 2015), the EU temporary relocation system aims to retain the 
system in abeyance by introducing an instrument that has been devised for exceptional and 
emergency situations. The alternative distribution key criteria are only to be used “in times of 
crisis”. The current situation, however, is not so exceptional or casuistic, showing as it does a 
phenomenon that can be expected to continue and that has made revealed a deeper malady 
affecting the common European asylum system (CEAS). 
The logic of the Dublin system puts a disproportionate amount of pressure on frontline EU 
member states holding the common EU external land and sea borders. Photographs and other 
evidence provided by the UN, the Council of Europe and civil society organisations working 
on the ground show that the reception and humanitarian conditions in many of these EU 
member states are systematically deficient (Carrera & Guild, 2015). UNHCR has acquired 
ample evidence showing that inadequate access to asylum procedures, a continued backlog in 
assessing asylum applications and inhuman detention conditions in several EU member 
states.51  
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has stated that the Dublin system is 
“dysfunctional and ineffective and should be urgently reformed to ensure ‘equitable burden 
sharing’ among member States”. 52  A similar call has been given by the Human Rights 
Commissioner of the Council of Europe, who has said that “the “Dublin system” leaves a few 
frontline southern EU countries to bear a disproportionate responsibility for asylum-seekers, 
and in any case it doesn’t conform with international human rights standards. EU countries 
need to agree on a new system based on the principles of inter-state solidarity as well as on 
effective human rights protection.”53 
Hence, people often do not wish to stay and apply for asylum in these countries, but would 
prefer to move elsewhere in the EU. The controversial assumption in the Dublin system that 
people can be generally obliged to stay and apply for asylum in the country of first entry has 
proved to be one the main obstacles hindering the effectiveness of EU asylum policy (Guild, 
Costello, Garlick & Moreno-Lax, 2015a). The new EU relocation system is a significant 
improvement in that it takes due account of the private, family and personal circumstances of 
                                                   
50 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 estab-
lishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 31–59. 
51 See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45116# and United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (2015), “UNHCR welcomes more EU support to refugees, urges fast im-
plementation”, 24 September (http://www.unhcr.org/5603d2a66.html). 
52 http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5798&lang=2&cat=8  
53 http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/a-to-do-list-for-the-refugee-crisis  
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asylum-seekers in making relocation decisions. Contrary to claims by certain actors such as 
the European Parliament, however, the new system still does not take into account the 
personal preferences of the persons involved.54  
When it comes to the ‘hotspots approach’, one can indeed welcome the priority given to 
making EU home affairs agencies, such as EASO and Frontex, more effectively operationalised 
in supporting most affected EU member states in confronting domestic challenges in migration 
and asylum systems. The fact that this approach, however, is still anchored in the Dublin 
system and that the reception conditions in many countries are profoundly deficient 
undermine this model. Moreover, the agencies’ responsibilities are, at least formally, limited 
to supporting Greek and Italian authorities in specific areas considered to be particularly 
problematic or “hot”. These EU agencies do not directly intervene or take part in national 
decisions concerning border controls (entry/refusal) in the common Schengen area or in 
assessing asylum applications, which in turn also limits the extent to which they can actually 
fill the gaps in current national systems. 
3.2  Enforcing member states’ implementation of EU standards 
The last months have also made clear that the extremely poor state of domestic transposition 
and practical implementation of EU-level asylum standards by some EU member states. When 
it comes to asylum policy, a particularly problematic aspect is the low record of 
implementation by member states of the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33 (Guild & 
Carrera, 2015).55 This not only relates to an ‘easy check’ of specific legislative reforms following 
EU legal acts. It also demonstrates a more profound deficit concerning the judicial and 
administrative capacities of some EU member states, particularly when it comes to domestic 
asylum systems (Gros, 2015). 
The Commission’s announcement that it will more effectively ensure the enforcement of EU 
legislation and standards is a welcome development. A total of 40 infringement decisions 
against several EU member states were launched in mid-September 2015 for failing to 
implement EU asylum legislation.56 The Commission adopted on the 10 December 2015 a total 
of 8 infringement decisions for failing to fully transpose and implement the Common 
European Asylum System against Greece, Croatia, Italy, Malta and Hungary.57 Conversely, 
Slovakia has asked the Court of Justice of the European Union to rule on the legality of the 
above-mentioned EU temporary relocation scheme on largely dubious grounds of lack of legal 
competence and interference of national sovereignty.58  
Guaranteeing a proper and timely implementation and enforcement of existing EU laws and 
standards by member states on the ground is critical for the legitimacy of the entire CEAS and 
                                                   
54  See www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0306&lan-
guage=EN  
55 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 96–116 
56  For a detailed picture of these infringement procedures, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-15-5699_en.htm  
57 See www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-com-infringements-10-12-15.pdf  
58 See EUobserver, “Slovakia filing case against EU migrant relocation”, 30 September (https://eu-
observer.com/justice/130499).  
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the effectiveness of any of the EU measures adopted during the last five months of 2015. Civil 
society organisations like ECRE (European Council of Refugee and Exiles) have recalled 
European countries duty to ensure adequate reception conditions and treat of people in need 
of international protection with dignity and respect, particularly in prospect of the winter 
season approaching.59 In the same vein, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights has recently stated that  
Over the last two months, several European countries of transit have been employing restrictive 
policies against migrants and refugees who are trying to reach European countries further north. 
However, the Czech Republic is unique in routinely subjecting these migrants and refugees to 
detention for 40 days, and reportedly sometimes even longer -- up to 90 days -- in conditions which 
have been described as degrading.60  
When it comes to Schengen, some voices have alluded to the existence of a link between the 
refugee crisis and the Schengen system. As it has been argued elsewhere, there is no evidence 
showing that the Schengen system has been under threat during these last months or that there 
is a need for legislative reform (Guild, Brouwer, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2015). The few EU 
member states which have reintroduced temporary internal border checks for over a period of 
two to three months have done so in accordance to the rules envisaged in Article 25 the 
Schengen Borders Code and the rules on temporary reintroduction of border checks. They 
have been properly notified to the member states, the General Secretariat of the Council and 
the European Commission.61 The necessity and proportionality of any further expansion of 
these controls has been also subject to EU rule of law scrutiny. 
Moreover, the dramatic events in Paris on the 13 November 2015 have shed some shadows as 
regards the acquired obligations by EU Member States under the EU temporary relocation 
system. That notwithstanding, President of the European Commission Juncker speech at the 
G20 Meeting on the 15 November importantly underlined the need to delink terrorism and 
refugee’s debates in Europe, 62  and that people seeking international protection are not 
criminals or potential terrorists.63 He argued:  
                                                   
59  See http://ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1223-eu-preoccupied-
with-border-protection-instead-of-the-protection-of-refugees-rights.html and http://ecre.org/compo-
nent/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1222-with-winter-approaching-ecre-urgently-calls-
on-europe-to-act.html 
60 See www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16632&LangID=E  
61 According to the information provided by these three countries to the General Secretariat of the Coun-
cil, in the case of Austria, for instance, the main purposes of these measures has been to allow registra-
tion of persons entering and ensuring proper reception, medical care and initial food provision. Refer 
to Council of the EU, Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at Austrian inter-
nal borders in accordance to Article 25 of Regulation No. 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 12435/15, 28 September 2015. See also 
Council of the EU, Prolongation of the temporary reintroduction of border controls at Slovenian internal 
borders in accordance to Article 25 of Regulation No. 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders, 12418/15, 25 September 2015. 
62 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-6091_en.htm 
63 See D. Bigo et al. (2015), “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks”, CEPS 
Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
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I try to make it crystal clear that we should not mix the different categories of people 
coming to Europe. The one who is responsible for the attacks in Paris cannot be put on 
an equal footing with real refugees, with asylum-seekers and with displaced people. 
These are criminals and not refugees or asylum-seekers. I would like to invite those in 
Europe who are trying to change the migration agenda we have adopted –I would like 
to invite them to be serious about this and not to give in to these basic reactions. I don't 
like it. 
Moreover, he stated: “The cynics who exploit the suffering of Paris have not understood that 
those who perpetrated the attacks are precisely those whom the refugees are trying to flee.”64 
The situation in Hungary is rather specific one, but certainly not an exception in the EU. There 
have been observed distinct shortcomings in the country’s respect for democratic rule of law 
and fundamental rights, which have repercussions in many areas including those related to 
asylum and border controls. The building of walls in the border zones between Hungary and 
Croatia and Slovenia have drawn wide criticism and concerns. In his State of Union speech 
before the European Parliament, Commission President Juncker stated that “walls and fences 
have no place in EU Member States”.65  
A key challenge in current border policies and criminalisation practices in Hungary is that 
Schengen rules accept no walls stopping asylum-seekers from having access to international 
protection in the EU. This principle is not only a key foundational component of EU borders 
and asylum law. It is one of the key values outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union as a condition for EU membership. In early October of this year, the Commission sent 
a letter to the Hungarian Government asking for information concerning the latest legislative 
reforms in the laws on asylum, borders, police and national defence adopted in July and 
September 2015, in order to examine their compatibility with EU law. The letter expresses deep 
concern about the quasi-systematic dismissal of applications for international protection in the 
border with Serbia, the lack of guarantees in asylum procedures and effective remedies, 
criminal sanctions imposed on immigrants crossing the borders and the lack of adequate 
safeguards in the rights of the defence, the closing of border crossing points and powers 
granted to the military in the area of border management. On 10 December 2015, the 
Commission officially opened infringement procedures against Hungary concerning its new 
asylum law.66 
With respect to the latter concern, the Commission’s letter states that military authorities must 
be bound by the same guarantees and legal obligations, including the provisions regarding 
the rights of refugees and persons seeking international protection. Furthermore, the 
Commission added that measures taken at the common EU external borders must be 
proportionate and necessary, subject to effective control and compliant with fundamental 
rights. These issues remain unresolved in the case of Hungary and will require further EU rule 
of law intervention in the near future. 
 
 
                                                   
64 Refer to http://independent.com.mt/articles/2015-11-22/blogs-opinions/A-European-approach-to-
migration-learning-the-lessons-of-Malta-6736145635  
65 Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/soteu/docs/state_of_the_union_2015_en.pdf  
66 See http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/dec/eu-com-infringement-hungary-10-12-15.pdf 
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3.3 Guaranteeing rule of law and human rights when the EU goes 
abroad? 
Questions of compliance with EU standards and principles, as indeed international law, not 
only relate to member states’ actions inside the EU, but they also concern measures abroad or 
in cooperation with third countries. A first case in point is the CSDP Operation Sophia. This 
operation has been qualified as particularly tricky and sensitive in nature, given its ambitions 
and its potentially damaging effects and risks due to its legal uncertainty and blurred strategy, 
as well as the potentially damaging repercussions in Libya (Faleg & Blockmans, 2015).  
Launched on June 22nd, Operation Sophia was only granted international legal mandate by 
way of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2240 on October 9th. This 
Resolution authorises states and regional organisations to intercept, inspect, seize and dispose 
(i.e. destroy) vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya for a period of one year, but only 
when they have “reasonable grounds to believe” that these vessels, inflatable boats, rafts and 
dinghies are being used for smuggling and human trafficking from Libya.67 In fact, the UNSC 
Resolution circumscribes the kind, level and reach of the intervention within strict rule of law 
parameters.  
For instance, the Resolution puts special emphasis on the need for states and regional 
organisations to display “good faith efforts to obtain the consent of the flag state” before the 
inspection of the vessels. Any subsequent seizure or disposal of such vessels must happen in 
accordance with applicable international law “with due consideration of the interests of any 
third parties who have acted in good faith”. The Resolution also stresses the obligation of states 
and regional organisations carrying out such UNSC mandated activities “to provide safety for 
the persons on board as an utmost priority and to avoid causing harm to the maritime 
environment or to the safety of navigation”.68  
Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution thus effectively details the 
circumstances under which the use of force may be used, all in keeping with the protection of 
migrants’ rights, international human rights obligations, international refugee law and the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. In short, UNSC Resolution 2240 lays down a set of 
standards which may well complicate the practical running of the operation, especially when 
confronted on the high seas with smugglers who have proven to possess callous disregard for 
the well-being of their ‘clients’. To be sure, UNSC Resolution 2240 does not authorize 
EUNAVFOR MED to act within the territorial and internal waters of Libya, let alone on Libyan 
territory, as projected by the Decision adopted by the Council of the EU.69 
When it comes to cooperation with third countries, the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey 
remains critical, as recent reports from NGOs and UNHCR evidence.70 The careful language 
of the above-mentioned statement (Section 2.3.3 above) 71  regarding persons in need of 
                                                   
67 UNSC Resolution 2240 (2015), SC/12072, 9 October 2015. 
68 Refer to paragraphs 7, 8 and 10 of the Resolution. 
69 See part (ii) of phase 2 as well as phase 3 of the Operation, in Article 2(2)(b) and (c) of Council Decision 
(CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015, OJEU L 122/31. 
70 See www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.htmlhttp://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/syrian-ref-
ugees-turkey-long-road-ahead; and www.hrw.org/report/2015/11/16/europes-refugee-cri-
sis/agenda-action 
71 See Press 870/15, 29/11/2015. 
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international protection indicates that the EU leaders are well aware that the return of Syrian, 
Iraqi or Afghan refugees to Turkey is likely to be impossible both in practice and in law. If the 
reception conditions in Greece are inadequate for their return to that country, it is unlikely that 
the European supranational courts will find that the ever more problematic reception 
conditions for Syrian refugees in Turkey will be acceptable and compliant with European 
fundamental human rights law.  
3.4 A multi-policy angle for the EU agenda on migration  
The Migration Agenda put forward a set of ‘pillars’ or fields of action to guide the common 
EU migration policy in the ‘medium term’, including questions related to working in parallel 
on matters related to the management of border controls, asylum, irregular immigration and 
legal immigration aspects. President Tusk has recently stated:  
Europe is taking its responsibility - saving lives, welcoming refugees and those entitled 
to international protection, offering more organised routes for legal migration, and 
dismantling criminal organisations. If we are not able to find humanitarian and efficient 
solutions, then others will find solutions which are inhumane, nationalistic and for sure 
not European.72 
The overview provided in the previous sections of this essay illustrates how so far the priority 
has been given to policy responses driven by security (home affairs), diplomatic and military 
concerns and interests of the EU and its member states. Examples include the predominance 
given to measures covering the fight against smuggling, measures on removal and 
readmission of irregular migrants or measures targeting the reinforcement of border controls. 
This has been noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which has stated 
that EU countries should avoid “a narrow emphasis on border control and security” in dealing 
with the migration crisis, and instead embrace a “holistic, rights-based and effective” approach 
involving countries of transit and origin”, and expressed concerns about the priority so far 
given by the EU to:  
…keeping refugees out or at the periphery of the European Union. Beyond that, 
however, it reveals a reluctance to accept protection responsibilities, with no mention of 
resettlement, and a lack of solidarity in burden-sharing between States.73 
The official justification given for these developments to take priority over others has been 
their framing as “immediate actions” and urgent “short-term measures”. This has led to the 
marginalisation of other non-security related policy sectors of especial relevance for migration 
policies which frame human mobility not as a ‘security issue’ but rather one related mainly to 
employment, economic and trade opportunities, fundamental rights and development 
considerations. And while the Commission and High Representative are calling for more 
‘coherence’ between different EU policy sectors, this should not lead to EU responses that give 
priority to EU and member states’ security prerogatives over other policy approaches and 
                                                   
72  See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/10/15-16/ and Opening 
Speech at Valetta Conference (www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11-tusk-
opening-statement-valletta-summit/). 
73  See http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=22058&lang=en and 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-en.asp?newsid=5799&lang=2 
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agendas.74 
This single-minded focus of the EU measures and developments adopted during the last five 
months has prevented proper consideration, priorities and concrete outputs related to cross-
border human mobility and asylum. For instance, the economic and social dimensions of 
asylum and immigration are of central importance but they have not been properly addressed 
in the last few months. The Commission has stated that asylum-seekers should have access to 
EU labour markets, but no concrete ideas or initiatives to this end have been presented so far.  
A welcomed exception to this has been the European Economic Forecast published by the DG 
for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission. The Forecast puts put 
forward some positive economic effects and repercussions of the current refugee flows into 
the EU and states:  
It should be noted that an inflow of about one million persons into the EU in 2015 as a 
whole would correspond to just 0.2% of the total population. This is markedly less than 
e.g. the increase in the foreign-born population by more than 6 million persons (or 15%) 
in Spain alone between 1995-2008. The number also pales when compared to Syria’s 
neighbouring countries. Depending on how the situation in Syria and its neighbouring 
countries develops (as well as other parts of MENA, South Asia and Africa), a sustained 
further rise in the influx of migrants cannot be excluded.75 
Moreover, when it comes to the impact of the larger-than-expected inflows of asylum-seekers 
on the economies of the EU, the report concludes that “the economic impact is expected to be 
relatively small in the medium term, raising the level of GDP by 0.2-0.3% above the baseline 
by 2020”, and argues: 
While unevenly distributed across countries, the estimated additional public 
expenditure related to the arrival of asylum-seekers is limited for most EU Member 
States. For the most affected transit countries, the currently-estimated effect on the 
headline balance amounts to a maximum of 0.2% of GDP in 2015, broadly stabilising in 
2016. For destination countries, the impact amounts to a maximum of 0.2% of GDP in 
2015, with a small further increase in some countries in 2016. In Sweden, which has 
among the highest share of refugees as a percentage of the population in the EU, the 
impact on the headline balance is expected to be closer to 0.5% of GDP this year. The 
corresponding positive effects on growth would be somewhat smaller….As a result, 
this implies an increase in the EU labour force of about 0.1% by the end of 2015 and by 
0.3% in both 2016 and 2017.76 
Moreover, as DG Trade of the Commission has recently acknowledged in its strategy “Trade 
for All”,77 the temporary movement of professionals constitutes an essential factor for all the 
sectors to conduct business internationally, it provides exports and helps to close the skills gap 
                                                   
74 This was in fact identified as one of the key elements to guide the European Agenda. The Communi-
cation stated that “As outlined by President Juncker in his Political Guidelines, a robust fight against 
irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and securing Europe's external borders must be paired 
with a strong common asylum policy as well as a new European policy on legal migration. Clearly, this 
requires an enhanced coherence between different policy sectors, such as development cooperation, trade, 
employment, foreign and home affairs policies (page 6). (Emphasis added).” 
75 See http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip011_en.pdf  
76 Pages 48-51 of the report. 
77 See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/tradoc_153846.pdf  
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in the EU. For the EU to fully benefit from the economic and social potential of migration, a 
key priority area needs to be ensuring a more flexible and improved application of current EU 
visa policy, which should include more flexible and harmonious use of humanitarian visas 
(Jensen, 2014). This needs to be accompanied by the development of more legal channels for 
economic immigration into the EU for employment-related purposes. The creation of legal 
channels of immigration has been conspicuously absent across all the EU responses to the 
crisis. A similar view has been expressed by the UN special representative international 
migration, who has argued:  
Perhaps the single most effective contribution would be to establish less cumbersome 
means for asylum-seekers to reach safety. Providing humanitarian visas – which can be 
issued with minimal delay – constitutes one clear commitment countries could make 
immediately. Over time, countries could also establish procedures enabling asylum-
seekers to apply more easily for labor, student, or family reunification visas.78 
These sector-specific contributions, which move beyond a security-driven vision of cross-
border human mobility, have not been properly acknowledged, communicated and followed 
up by European authorities. The responses so far have not taken either into account the 
relevance and effects of the adopted instruments from a foreign affairs and development 
cooperation perspectives. In a previous Commission Communication on the work of Task 
Force Mediterranean the Commission had stated:  
Given the nature of migratory movements, transit countries along the Southern 
Mediterranean coasts will need to be given incentives to engage in cooperation 
concerning migrants who are not citizens of their countries. Therefore, a wider 
perspective needs to be applied and positive messaging on migration by the EU put 
forward. Relations with partner countries will also have to take into account the specific 
sensitivities and expectations of partner countries on the migration dossier, and their 
perception that the EU wishes to focus primarily on security-related aspects, readmission/return 
and the fight against irregular migration (emphasis added).79 
This still constitutes an Achilles heel of the European Agenda on Migration (Guild & Carrera, 
2013; Carrera, 2011). The above-mentioned Council Conclusions on the future of the return 
policy of 8 October 2015 may be seen a step backwards in EU policy by insisting on a purely 
conditional and ‘more-for-more’ approach when it comes to EU cooperation with third 
countries on migration. The idea to make development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
conditional on cooperating with the EU on return and readmission sends a clear message in 
the same direction. The compatibility of this ‘conditionality’ approach with the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals is highly questionable.  
4. What policy priorities for the next phase of the European agenda 
on migration? 
PRIORITY 1: EU policy responses need to move from a security-centric focus towards a 
‘multi-sector policy approach guaranteeing a balanced setting of priorities across all relevant 
policy sectors such as development cooperation, foreign affairs, trade, economic, as well as 
                                                   
78 ttps://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-refugee-crisis-by-peter-sutherland-2015-
09#OqRZgfGrwAHRaj76.99  
79 Commission Communication (2013), on the work of Task Force Mediterranean, COM(2013) 869. 
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social and employment considerations. All these responses should fully guarantee a 
fundamental human rights compliant focus, so that their effects over individuals’ well-being 
and lives are properly and systematically prioritized over other sectoral policy considerations 
and interests. This is a central condition for ensuring the legitimacy of the EU both inside its 
borders as well as when engaging in effective cooperation and partnerships with third 
countries. A policy mainly focused on security approach driven by EU and Member States’ 
interests will damage EU’s image abroad and will pose fundamental obstacles over foreign 
affairs and wider international relations. 
PRIORITY 2: The EU Dublin System needs to be fundamentally revisited and substituted by 
a new regime of redistribution of responsibility on the basis of new ‘key criteria’. These criteria 
should combine numerical factors, as well as the personal, family and personal circumstances 
and preferences of asylum-seekers. The issue is not only about moving asylum-seekers around 
but also about making sure that proper reception conditions are in place everywhere across 
the Union. The upcoming evaluation by the European Commission of the Dublin system 
constitutes a key opportunity for this process to be launched. A key for the success of the future 
European asylum and borders systems will be boosting legal sharing of responsibility by 
boosting institutional capacity. The EU should call for the setting up of a common European 
Asylum service with the competence in assisting member states in the assessment of asylum 
applications, building their domestic capacity on reception and deciding on the redistribution 
of asylum applications on the basis of new criteria (Carrera, Gros and Guild, 2015). 
PRIORITY 3: The Commission should, in close cooperation with the European Parliament, 
more effectively (and independently) monitor and properly enforce existing EU law asylum 
and borders standards by Member States, as well as their compliance with the principles laid 
down in Article 2 TEU. Strict oversight should be exerted to the implementation of EU 
measures that have the potential of violating international law. A case in point is CSDP 
Operation Sophia, whose Operation Plan and Rules of Engagement should be scrupulously 
subjected to the highest international (legal) standards and guarantees applicable to search 
and rescue at sea, including human rights law. 
PRIORITY 4: The future of the EU common external borders policy is also a central issue. If 
the Schengen Area is to endure, it needs to establish a common institution responsible for 
securing external borders (Gros, 2015). The Commission aims at opening a debate about the 
setting up of a common European border service and coastal guard. Any future step towards 
the setting up a common European border service should take the uniform and high standard 
application/implementation of the Schengen Borders Code. Such as service should follow a 
predominantly civilian (non-military) nature and should come along the establishment of a 
‘border monitor’ to ensure administrative guarantees and fundamental rights (Carrera, 2010). 
The mandate and competences of these European officials could be set up in a gradual or 
phased-in fashion basis in selected external (air, land and sea) border crossing points, with the 
ambition to expand to all the main external crossing points. A starting point should be a true 
‘European coast guard’, with its own budget, ships, and personnel, as a flexible tool to a 
flexible tool with which to allocate resources as effectively as possible at any given moment 
(Gros, 2015). 
  
22 | CARRERA, BLOCKMANS, GROS & GUILD 
 
References 
Bigo, D. et al. (2015), “The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks”, 
CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
Blockmans, S. and S. Russack, “The Commissioners’ Group on External Action: Essential 
political facilitator of inter-service cooperation”, CEPS Special Report No. 125, 
CEPS, December. 
Carrera, S. (2010), “Towards a Common European Border Service”, CEPS Working 
Document, CEPS, Brussels. 
Carrera, S. (2011), “The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the 
Southern Mediterranean: Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to Migration”, 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels. 
Carrera, S. and K. Lannoo (2015), “Treat the Root Causes of the Asylum Crisis, not the 
Symptoms”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels.  
Carrera, S., E. Guild and D. Gros (2015), “What priorities for the new European agenda 
on migration?”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels. 
Faleg, G. and S. Blockmans (2015), “EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in 
troubled waters”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels. 
Gros, D. (2015), “Europe’s Double Refugee Crisis”, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels. 
Gros, D. (2015), “Schengen and European Security”, Project Syndicate, 10 December, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/schengen-open-borders-help-
security-by-daniel-gros-2015-12 
Guild, E. and S. Carrera (2013), “EU Borders and their Controls: Preventing unwanted 
movement of people in the EU?”, CEPS Essay No. 6, CEPS, Brussels, 14 November. 
Guild, E. and S. Carrera (2015), “Can the New EU Refugee Relocation System Work? 
Perils in the Dublin Logic and Flawed Reception Conditions in the EU”, CEPS 
Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels. 
Guild, E., E. Brouwer, K. Groenendijk and S. Carrera (2015), “What is Happening to the 
Schengen Borders”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels. 
Guild, E., C. Costello, M. Garlick and V. Moreno-Lax (2015), “Enhancing the Common 
European Asylum System and Alternatives to Dublin”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and 
Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels.  
Guild, E., C. Costello, M. Garlick and V. Moreno-Lax (2015), “The 2015 Refugee Crisis in 
the European Union”, CEPS Policy Brief, CEPS, Brussels. 
Jensen, U.I. (2014), “Humanitarian Visas: Option or Obligation?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty 
and Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels. 
CEPS, Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium  Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and authoritative 
think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum for debate on EU 
affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and complemented by an extensive 
network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today 
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process 
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations 
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
